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# Editor's Note

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This issue of *Deliberatio* gathers its contributions around the theme *Philosophical Practice: Contemporary Questions and Answers*, a formulation that should be heard not as the promise of definitive solutions, but as an invitation to follow philosophy where it is most exposed to life. The articles brought together here approach philosophical practice not as a marginal extension of academic philosophy, but as one of its most demanding contemporary forms: a reflective, dialogical, ethically alert engagement with suffering, agency, value, meaning, technology, and the fragile conditions of shared life. Together, they show that philosophical practice is not reducible to advice, therapy, applied ethics, or conceptual analysis alone. It is a living field in which rigorous thinking becomes responsive to concrete human situations, and in which contemporary questions require not only answers, but better forms of questioning.

Opening the issue, Elliot D. Cohen's article "Using Logic-Based Therapy to Empower Clients: A Case of an Emotionally Abused Client" offers a lucid and practically forceful account of Logic-Based Therapy, the philosophical counselling modality he created, grounded in the analysis of emotional reasoning. The article's central insight is that clients are not merely passive sufferers of their emotions, but often participate, through practical inferences, in the construction and reinforcement of their distress. Cohen reconstructs these inferences as syllogistic structures in which empirical reports and evaluative rules generate self-defeating conclusions, and he shows how LBT can help clients identify, challenge, and transform the irrational premises from which debilitating emotions arise. The case of an emotionally abused client gives the argument particular ethical density: empowerment here does not mean simplistic encouragement, but the restoration of the client's capacity to reinterpret her own worth outside the oppressive logic imposed by abuse. By moving from fallacy to guiding virtue, and from emotional subjection to philosophical redecision, the article demonstrates how philosophical counselling can become a disciplined practice of liberation, helping the client

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recover agency through clearer reasoning, more humane self-understanding, and the courage to inhabit a less destructive moral vocabulary.

Georgiana-Diana Ghinea approaches the issue's theme through "Philosophical Counselling and the Reconfiguration of the Self: Conceptual Clarification and Normative Tension," where she examines philosophical counselling as a reflective practice situated between practical philosophy, Socratic inquiry, and contemporary non-clinical helping professions. Its strength lies in the way it refuses to treat suffering either as mere pathology or as a purely private emotional disturbance. Instead, the article shows how many contemporary forms of distress emerge from conflicts between internalized ideals and the finite conditions of life: the demand to perform, to control, to flourish, to be strong, to be endlessly responsible. Ghinea argues that philosophical counselling can clarify the concepts, values, and normative presuppositions through which persons judge themselves and their lives, especially when ideals harden into tyrannical agencies of guilt. In dialogue with positive psychology and Positive Psychotherapy, the article does not reject therapeutic languages of wellbeing, but subjects them to philosophical vigilance, asking when the language of flourishing becomes another instrument of pressure. Philosophical counselling appears here as a space where the self may be reconfigured through conceptual honesty, critical pluralism, and a more generous relation to finitude, one in which values are not abandoned, but released from rigid and punitive forms of internalization.

In "The Role of the Death Drive and Mystical Tendency in Kant's Ethics," Lukáš Arthur Švihura brings an intentionally provocative and interpretatively ambitious perspective to Kantian moral philosophy by reading it through Nietzschean critique, psychoanalytic discourse, and the notion of a mystical tendency. The article does not offer a conventional reconstruction of Kant's ethics; rather, it asks what deeper motivations may be at work beneath the familiar language of duty, practical reason, autonomy, and the division between phenomenal and noumenal selfhood. By placing Nietzsche's suspicion of life-denying morality in conversation with the psychoanalytic idea of the death drive, Švihura explores whether Kantian ethics can be interpreted as expressing not only rational self-legislation, but also a movement away from empirical vitality toward an impersonal, purified, almost inanimate order. This is a demanding and controversial thesis, but its significance for philosophical practice lies precisely in its power to unsettle inherited certainties. It invites practitioners and theorists alike to ask how moral ideals function in lived experience: whether they liberate, discipline, repress, transcend, or estrange the self from life. In this sense, the article contributes to the issue by reminding us that philosophical practice must also be able to interrogate the hidden affective and existential energies that animate even the most rational moral systems.

Robert Orgovan's "Artificial Intelligence and Moral Agency: Conceptual Clarifications for Philosophical Practice in AI Ethics" addresses one of the most urgent contemporary fields in which philosophical practice is called to intervene: the ethical status of artificial intelligence. The article begins from the concepts of artificial agent and artificial moral agent, engaging especially with Floridi and Sanders's account of agency through levels of abstraction, and then considers objections concerning responsibility, autonomy, and the limits of attributing moral status to artificial systems. Its value lies in its patient conceptual work. Rather than rushing toward speculative declarations about machine consciousness or moral personhood, the article clarifies the criteria by which agency itself is described, observed, and attributed. This makes it highly relevant for philosophical practice, because public discussions of AI often move too quickly from technical capacity to moral vocabulary, confusing automation with autonomy, responsiveness with responsibility, and behavioral complexity with ethical accountability. Orgovan's contribution helps restore philosophical discipline to this debate. It shows that AI ethics requires not only regulation and technical expertise, but also careful conceptual mediation: the ability to distinguish kinds of agency, levels of description, and the normative consequences of the language we use when speaking about artificial systems.

With "Nihilism as Method: Clearing Values in Philosophical Counselling," Daniel-Valentin Mioc reclaims nihilism from its usual association with despair, meaninglessness, and existential paralysis, proposing instead that it can function as a productive method within philosophical counselling. Drawing on Nietzsche's distinction between passive and active nihilism, the article argues that nihilism need not be approached only as a problem to be overcome, but can serve as a diagnostic and reflective instrument through which inherited values are suspended, tested, and cleared. This is an important move for philosophical practice, because clients do not always arrive in search of ready-made meanings; sometimes they arrive with the suspicion that received meanings no longer hold. The counsellor's task, in this view, is not to impose consolation or replace one dogma with another, but to accompany the client through the void opened by radical doubt. Mioc's article is particularly attentive to the contemporary conditions in which nihilism becomes intensified: digital life, algorithmic pressures, social fragmentation, and the weakening of inherited frameworks of meaning. Philosophical counselling becomes, here, a disciplined space for value-deconstruction and value-reconstruction, helping persons discover which commitments remain alive once obsolete or externally imposed meanings have been allowed to fall away.

The issue closes its sequence of articles with Florin Prună's "Shapes of the Anthropocene: Unknown Flowers," a contribution that expands the horizon of philosophical practice beyond the interpersonal and the strictly human, inviting readers to think within the troubled, fragile, and more-than-human realities of the

Anthropocene. Written in a form inspired by the layout and sensibility of a herbarium sheet, the article does not merely describe environmental crisis; it experiments with a way of seeing. Its central gesture is to search, amid the narratives of ruination that dominate Anthropocene discourse, for "unknown flowers": overlooked, emergent, affirmative, and regenerative possibilities of more-than-human coexistence. This does not mean denying the severity of climate change, ecological degradation, or socioenvironmental injustice. Rather, it means resisting the intellectual and affective exhaustion produced by purely catastrophic imaginaries. The article's multimodal and environmental-humanities approach gives philosophical practice a widened task: to cultivate forms of attention capable of perceiving neglected possibilities within damaged worlds. In this contribution, practice becomes ecological, aesthetic, critical, and imaginative at once. It asks how we may learn to notice, describe, and perhaps inhabit alternative modes of coexistence when inherited nature/culture divisions no longer help us understand the world we have made and must now learn to share differently.

Taken together, the articles in this issue suggest that philosophical practice is called to work precisely where inherited certainties no longer suffice: where suffering asks for more than symptom management, where moral ideals require examination rather than obedience, where artificial intelligence forces us to rethink agency and responsibility, where nihilism becomes a threshold rather than an endpoint, and where the Anthropocene asks us to enlarge the very community of concern beyond the human alone. What unites these contributions is not a single method, doctrine, or school, but a shared confidence that philosophy remains capable of meeting life without simplifying it. In this sense, philosophical practice appears here as a discipline of lucid accompaniment: it clarifies, unsettles, listens, distinguishes, and sometimes helps us begin again. It does not remove the difficulty of contemporary existence, but it can make that difficulty more thinkable, more speakable, and perhaps more humanly inhabitable.